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1. Introduction 
A large body of literature deals with the long-run development of environmental quality (see 
Dinda, 2004, and Stern, 2004, for an overview of empirical evidence and theoretical 
contributions). While the exact dynamics of environmental quality and, in particular, the 
‘environmental Kuznets curve’ are discussed controversially in the literature, it seems that 
there is a consensus on the fact that environmental quality deteriorates strongly over some 
earlier stages of development, while at later stages of development, the environmental 
deterioration at least slows down (where the time points and income levels at which these two 
phases begin may differ significantly across countries).  
Clearly, the analysis of environmental long-run development requires an interdisciplinary 
approach/model (henceforth, ‘PENS model’) capturing the relevant interactions across the 
political (P), economic (E), ecological/natural (N), and socio-cultural (S) systems of a 
country. 1  One of the major challenges in the analysis of complex social-technological 
systems such as the PENS model is the fact that quantitative modeling of such systems 
requires strong assumptions regarding the behavior of system elements, which are difficult to 
support by theory and evidence (particularly due to the social component of social-
technological systems) and may lead to odd model results or implications; thus, a qualitative 
analysis focusing on feedback loops in social-technological systems seems advantageous (see 
Coyle, 2000, for a detailed discussion). Moreover, considering the literature’s controversies 
regarding the quantitative aspects of environmental dynamics, a qualitative analysis of 
environmental development seems adequate. 
For all these reasons, we focus on the qualitative, interdisciplinary modeling of long-run 
environmental quality dynamics in our paper. In particular, we build a very simple, 
qualitative PENS model, where the PENS systems interact via environmental pollution, 
natural resource use, utility derived from economic standard of living (e.g., via consumption) 
and environmental quality, societal support of the economic system, economic policy, and 
social choice of the policy/political regime/leaders. We analyze this model upon existence of 
feedback loops/cycles among its components. As we show, there are feedback cycles in the 
economic-political-socio-cultural (EPS) subsystem and in the economic-socio-cultural (ES) 
subsystem. In particular, these cycles lead to a dynamic state of increasing (a) economic 
activity, (b) socio-cultural support of the economic system and the policy regime, and (c) 
environmental devastation and resource depletion, which we name ‘pollution phase’. 
However, the feedback cycles that constitute the pollution phase are counteracted/regulated 
by half-cycles/mechanisms in the economic-natural (EN) subsystem, economic-natural-socio-
cultural (ENS) subsystem, and the overall PENS system, which reduce economic growth and 
the socio-cultural support of the economy/policy due to the negative effects of environmental 
pollution and may lead to a political regime switch entailing a more environment-friendly 
policy and slower growth, a phase which we name ‘ecological phase’. That is, the PENS 
system is a self-regulating system, where the feedback cycles are regulated/restricted by half-
                                                     
1 The PENS system view has been used in the previous literature. Habermas (1973) applies the PENS model in 
the comparative analysis of economic systems. Wagner (2017, 2018a) discusses, among others, the challenges 
of the growth strategy of the Peoples Republic of China from the PENS view and notes that, e.g., pollution may 
endanger the current policy regime. Wagner (2018b) notes the importance of PENS modeling in stability policy 
(stabilization of macroeconomic short-run fluctuations). 
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cycles, such that environmental pollution is limited to some extent. The length (and other 
characteristics) of the pollution phase depend on different factors in our model (among others 
preferences, technologies, and political stability); thus, it is not surprising that the empirical 
research discussed at the beginning of this section has difficulties in finding definite income 
levels at which phase/policy-regime switches occur. If we assume that the marginal utilities 
of consumption and environmental quality are decreasing (i.e., the second derivatives of the 
utility function are negative), there occurs a policy-regime switch in general, i.e., the society 
switches from the pollution phase to the ecological phase. We show that this result can be 
used (in conjunction with other development literature) to justify a three-stage model of 
environmental development, while being consistent with the empirical evidence discussed at 
the beginning of this section. 
The primary aim of our paper is to motivate the application and demonstrate the applicability 
of interdisciplinary, qualitative (feedback-loop) analysis propagated by Coyle (2000) in 
(economic/societal) development theory and, in particular, in environmental development 
theory. Thus, we have chosen a relatively simple version of the PENS model. However, as 
discussed in Section 5, there is large scope for extensions of our basic model, their theoretical 
foundations, and more complex tools of analysis. In general, the system-theoretical treatise of 
development phenomena, which is the topic of our paper, seems an interesting complement to 
the standard approaches used in economic/societal development theory: The latter approaches 
deal with very specific channels of interactions across very specific variables of the PENS 
sub-systems (see Stijepic, 2018, for a discussion), while the system-theoretical approach 
provides rather an overview of the different channels. Beyond its methodical contribution 
(application of qualitative system-theoretical analysis), our paper contributes to the 
development literature dealing with stages of economic/societal development (e.g., Fourastié, 
1949, and Rostow, 1978) and to the structural change literature dealing with industrialization 
and de-industrialization (e.g., Kongsamut et al., 2001, Schettkat and Yocarini, 2006, Krüger, 
2008, Stijepic, 2015, 2017, and van Neuss, 2018). Moreover, obviously, it is a contribution to 
the empirical and theoretical literature on environmental development discussed at the 
beginning of this section. 
The next section discusses the model assumptions. Section 3 explains the model results 
(feedback cycles, regulatory half-cycles, characteristics of the phases, and their 
determinants). The implications of these results for a three-stage model of environmental 
development are discussed in Section 4. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Assumptions 
Our model is based on four indices: political regime index (p), economic activity index (e), 
environmental quality index (n), and socio-cultural index (s), all of which are real-valued. We 
assume that these indices do not only depend upon each other but also on other/exogenous 
variables, which we will not state here explicitly. Moreover, to avoid complex notation, e.g., 
the usage of differential equations and integrals, we express only the tendencies regarding the 
effects of indexes on each other. For doing so, we use the following notation: If there is a 
relation between two or more indexes, this relation is expressed by an arrow, where the 
variables that are listed at the tail of the arrow (and separated by commas) have an impact on 
the variable that is located at the tip of the arrow. The index (+) associated with a variable 
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listed at the tail of an arrow indicates that this variable has a positive effect on the variable 
located at the tip of the arrow. Analogously, the index (–) indicates that the variable has a 
negative effect on the variable located at the tip of the arrow. The model assumptions can, 
then, be summarized as follows. 
Economic activity (e) has a negative impact on the environmental quality (n) via, e.g., the 
environmental pollution caused by industrial production and transport. 
 
(1) e(–) → n 
 
The socio-cultural index (s) expresses the satisfaction of the society with the current state (of 
society, economy, and politics). We assume that the society draws utility from economic 
activity (e) via, e.g., consumption of goods, and from environmental quality (n). Thus, the 
greater e and n are, the greater the satisfaction s is. 
 
(2) e(+), n(+) → s 
 
The satisfaction of the society is deciding for its support of the policy regime. We assume 
that in the initial state, policy regime π2 is established. If the satisfaction of the society (s) 
falls below a certain level (σ), then the society enforces a policy regime change, i.e., policy 
regime π2 is replaced by policy regime π1, where π2 > π1. 
 
(3) (p = π2 if s > σ) and (p = π1 if s < σ) 
 
The economic activity index (e) is influenced by the other indexes along three channels. First, 
we assume that the policy regime π2 is supportive of quick expansion of economic activity, 
while the policy regime π1 allows for only relatively slow expansion of economic activity due 
to stronger environmental protection. Thus, the greater p is, the greater e is. Second, societal 
satisfaction (s) has a positive effect on economic activity (e). This is a lesson from economies 
plagued by crises, poor economic conditions, or, more generally, dissatisfaction with the 
current economic (and political) system, where full commitment (of capital and labor) in 
(legal) economic activities is depressed and incentives for rent seeking (e.g., economic 
crimes, corruption) and black market formation are increased. In general, this impact channel 
(of social satisfaction on economic activity) may not exist at all stages of development; 
however, it seems worthwhile being considered. Third, following Arrow et al. (1995) and 
Stern (2004), we assume that environmental damage has negative feedbacks on the economic 
system, i.e., the lower n is, the lower e is. 
 
(4) p(+), s(+), n(+) → e 
 
We turn now to the implications of the model described in this section. 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 summarizes the model described Section 2, where the Arabic numbers (1)-(4) refer 
to the assumptions (1)-(4) introduced in Section 2, and the arrows and signs (+ and –) 
5 
 
indicate the effects of variables on each other following the convention introduced in Section 
2. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 highlights that our assumptions imply that there are two feedback loops/cycles 
(denoted by dashed, closed curves and the Roman numbers (I) and (II)) and three regulatory 
half-cycles/mechanisms (denoted by dashed, open curves and the letters (A), (B), and (C)). 
We explain them in the following. 
Feedback loop (I) arises due to the interaction between the economic and social-cultural 
systems. According to (2), a (significant) increase in economic activity (e), may increase the 
satisfaction (s) of the society with the current system (e.g., via increased consumption and 
investment possibilities) and, thus, may increase the efforts/commitment of the society 
members when engaging in (legal) economic activities (cf. Section 2), which has a positive 
effect on economic activity via (4). Thus, we have a feedback loop, such that increases in e 
and s can go on for some time ceteris paribus. As noted in Section 2, the effect of s on e may 
be of relevance only at some specific development stages (or only in some countries with 
specific socio-economic conditions, e.g., (post-)socialist countries). Thus, the feedback loop 
(I) may generate only transitory growth effects. However, even transitory processes can be 
prolonged and can have strong cumulative effects. Thus, they are not necessarily neglectible. 
Feedback loop (II) states that, if a policy regime that is supportive of economic expansion 
(via (4)) is established (i.e., p = π2; cf. (3)), then the satisfaction of the society (s) grows via 
(2) and, thus, the support of the policy regime (p) grows via (3). That is, a growth supporting 
policy regime (π2) will not be replaced ceteris paribus; once it is established, it lasts forever 
(unless the regulatory cycles discussed below intervene). However, even this feedback loop 
may generate only transitory dynamics depending on the assumptions. Exactly speaking, 
whether the feedback loop (II) is able to generate permanent growth (when neglecting the 
e
s
+ (2)
+ 
(4
) (I)n p(II)
(C)
(A)
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regulatory cycles discussed below) depends on the nature of the economic system (e) and the 
effectiveness of the policy system (p) as a driver/supporter of economic growth. For example, 
endogenous (economic) growth theories (e.g., Romer, 1994) imply that permanent growth 
can exist under good institutional/political conditions (if environmental effects, i.e., the 
regulatory cycles discussed below, are neglected), while other theories (e.g., the classical 
political economy) are pessimistic about the (very) long-run growth prospects of 
(capitalist/market) economies. Needless to say that the whole economic growth theory deals 
with the topic of the possibility of permanent growth under ‘good’ political support (see, e.g., 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, for an overview). 
We can see that feedback loops (I) and (II) are not working against each other but are 
supporting each other. In particular, the increases in s generated by loop (I) help to support 
policy π2 and, thus, support loop (II). The latter generates an increase in e, which supports 
loop (I). This mutually supporting behavior of the two loops is geometrically manifested in 
Figure 1 by the fact that the two neighboring loops (I) and (II) on the graph depicted in Figure 
1 describe cyclical dynamics with different directions (clockwise vs. counterclockwise), 
which is a property of orientable graphs/complexes (see Figure 1). 
The increases in economic activity (e) generated by feedback loops (I) and (II) generate 
decreases in quality of environment (n) via (1). This gives rise to three regulatory 
mechanisms of development and pollution, which counteract/regulate the feedback loops (I) 
and (II) via negative feedbacks, as depicted by Figure 1: Regulatory half-cycle (A) works 
within the economic-environmental/natural-socio-cultural (ENS) subsystem of the PENS 
model: economic activity (e) reduces environmental quality (n) via (1) and, thus, social 
satisfaction (s) via (2) and, thus, economic activity via (4). Regulatory half-cycle (B) works 
within the economic-environmental/natural (EN) subsystem of the PENS model: economic 
activity (e) reduces environmental quality (n) via (1), which has a negative feedback on 
economic activity via (4). Regulatory half-cycle (C) works over the whole PENS system: 
economic activity (e) reduces environmental quality (n) via (1) and, thus, social satisfaction 
(s) via (2) and, thus, endangers the policy regime (p) via (3) that drives economic activity via 
(4). 
Note that the regulatory cycle (C) may take a lot of time before taking effect, since the policy 
system (p) has homeostatic characteristics: The social satisfaction (s) may be declining over 
long periods without changing the policy regime (p). However, as soon as the environmental 
quality and, thus, the satisfaction falls below a certain satisfaction level (σ), the policy regime 
is changed. That is, the growth enhancing regime may be prolonged. 
The three regulatory cycles (A)-(C) have the same (counterclockwise) orientation, i.e., they 
are supportive of each other. Each of the cycles (A)-(C) arises due to the fact that economic 
activity (e) has a negative impact on environmental quality (n), and each of the cycles (A)-(C) 
feeds back to the economic system (by reducing the rate of economic expansion). That is, the 
economic system is not only the source but also the target/destination of the regulatory cycles 
(A)-(C). The environmental/natural system determines the sign of the effect transported via 
the half-cycles (A)-(C): as we can see in Figure (1), in each of the three cycles (A)-(C), the 
connection to the environmental/natural system has a negative sign, while all other 
connections have positive signs. While the cycle (B) immediately loops back from the 
environmental/natural system to the economic system, cycle (A) has the socio-cultural system 
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as an (additional) intermediary, and cycle (C) has the socio-cultural and political systems as 
(additional) intermediaries. 
By now, our discussion shows that, if the society establishes the policy regime π2, it enters a 
phase of economic expansion and decreasing environmental quality due feedback loops (I) 
and (II). We name this phase pollution phase. The feedback loops (I) and (II) are 
counteracted by the regulatory mechanisms/half-cycles (A)-(C), such that, in general, the 
pollution phase comes to an end and a new phase, which we name ecological phase, is 
initiated by the replacement of policy π2 by policy π1, where the latter is characterized by 
weaker economic expansion and weaker environmental deterioration. The high rate of 
economic expansion during the pollution phase is reduced by the negative effects of 
decreasing environmental quality and decreasing social satisfaction on economic activity 
(half-cycles (B) and (A)). Moreover, a policy regime change and, thus, an end of the 
pollution phase may be initiated by increasing social dissatisfaction (half-cycle (C)) as 
explained above. 
The characteristics of the pollution phase depend on the relative strength of the regulatory 
mechanisms (A), (B), and (C) among others. In particular, it can happen that due to 
regulatory mechanisms (A) and (B), the rate of economic expansion decreases over a long 
period of time (while the environmental quality decreases as well) before a policy regime 
switch (to the environment-friendly policy π1) occurs via mechanism (C). On the other hand, 
if mechanism (C) is relatively strong, the society may switch relatively quickly to the 
ecological phase. 
At this place, the question about the exact determinants of the length of the pollution phase 
arises. To answer this question, we specify the assumptions made in Section 2 by assuming 
that (a) the society seeks to maximize the concave utility function (u) as stated by (5) and (b) 
the societal satisfaction depends positively on this utility as stated by (6). 
 
(5a) max(e,n) u 
(5b) u: ℝ×ℝ→ℝ 
(5c) u = u(e, n) 
(5d) ∂u/∂e > 0 
(5e) ∂u/∂n > 0 
(5f) ∂2u/(∂e)2 < 0 
(5g) ∂2u/(∂n)2 < 0 
(6a) s: ℝ→ℝ 
(6b) s = s(u) 
(6c) ds/du > 0 
 
Assumptions (5) and (6) allow us to explain the switch from the policy π2 and the pollution 
phase to the policy π1 and the ecological phase by using standard economic arguments: 
Neglect for a moment the mechanisms (A)-(C), which are, anyway, supportive of the 
following argumentation. Then, under policy π2, e grows quickly, and n decreases quickly. 
This implies in conjunction with (5) (and, in particular, with the concavity assumption (5d)-
(5g)) that the marginal utility of n increases quickly and the marginal utility of e decreases 
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quickly, such that at some point of time, the utility u (cf. (5)) begins to decrease (unless it is 
already decreasing) and, thus, s begins to decrease (cf. (6)). This process of declining u and s 
continues until s < σ. Then, the society enforces a policy regime switch, i.e., policy π1 is 
established (cf. (3)), which means slower economic growth and more environmental 
protection (cf. Section 2). In other words, the ecological phase is initiated. In a model of a 
rational representative household with perfect foresight, the policy regime switch may happen 
even earlier, since the household foresees that n and, thus, the utility may continue decreasing 
even after the regime switch. However, the assumption of a rational representative household 
with perfect foresight seems highly questionable in the context of collective environmental 
decision making, which is characterized by externality (free rider) and public choice 
problems. Thus, our rather crude model of Section 2 and the argumentation via cycles (A)-
(C) seem preferable. Nevertheless, the utility and representative-household related 
argumentation highlights one important fact: If we want to ensure that a policy switch occurs, 
we have to assume that policy π1 is not only environment-friendlier than policy π2 but also 
ensures a certain economic wellbeing since the society requires both, economic and 
environmental wellbeing. 
This discussion shows that decreasing marginal utilities of economic activity (e) and 
environmental quality (n) can ensure a switch of the policy regime, i.e., an end of the 
pollution phase and the beginning of the ecological phase. Moreover, if  
(a) the expansion of economic activity (e) is relatively weak, 
(b) the deterioration of environmental quality (n) is relatively strong,  
(c) the utility function is such that the marginal utilities decrease strongly (cf. (5)), or  
(d) the policy regime π2 does not, anyway, have a strong support in the society, i.e., s 
is close to σ (cf. (3)), 
then the pollution phase is relatively short ceteris paribus. Thus, the length of the pollution 
phase depends not only on utility parameters (cf. (c)) and the general stability of the policy 
regime (cf. (d)) but also on the technology(-policy). In particular, if the economic policy π2 
supports an inferior technology that generates relatively slow economic expansion or a 
relatively strong degradation of environmental quality (cf. (a) and (b)), then the pollution 
phase ends very quickly. The same is true if the chosen technology is not (only) the result of 
policy decision but (also) of poor technological possibilities (as in many developing 
countries). These facts are potential explanations of the cross-country differences regarding 
the time-points and income levels at which the ecological phase begins. 
The same arguments apply as well to the effectivity of regulatory mechanisms (A)-(C), i.e., to 
the question of how quickly the regulatory mechanisms (A)-(C) enforce the beginning of the 
ecological phase. The effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism (A) is not only determined 
by the points (a)-(d) but also by the strength of the effect of s on e via (4), i.e., on the strength 
of the direct dependency of economic activity on socio-cultural support discussed in Section 
2. Similarly, the effectiveness of regulatory mechanism (B) depends on the elasticity of 
economic activity with respect to natural quality changes via (4) (cf. Section 2) in addition to 
the points (a)-(d). The effectiveness of regulatory mechanism (C) depends primarily on the 
points (a)-(d). 
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Overall, our results imply that the cross-country differences in the time-points and income 
levels at which the ecological phase is initiated can be explained by cross-country differences 
regarding: 
(i) preferences (particularly, the degree of concavity of the societal utility function),  
(ii) technology frontiers (particularly, the feasibility of the technology to generate 
quick economic expansion or low environmental impact (clean vs. dirty technology)), 
(iii) technological proficiency/efficiency of the political system (particularly, the 
question of whether the political system chooses/supports a technology that is at the 
technology frontier or a technology that is inferior regarding the economic growth 
potential and environmental pollution), 
(iv) general support of the political regime (particularly, the question of whether the 
regime is close to an overthrow for reasons other than economic and ecological ones), 
(v) the direct dependency of economic expansion on societal support/satisfaction, i.e. 
the dependency of economic system well-functioning on the commitment of the 
society members to (legal) economic activity (cf. (4) and Section 2), and 
(vi) the direct dependency of economic expansion on environmental quality à la 
Arrow et al. (1995) (cf. (4) and Section 2). 
Now, we apply these results in a three-stage model of environmental development. 
 
4. A three-stage model of environmental development 
The model developed in the previous sections can be used in conjunction with other theories 
of economic development to establish a three-stage model of environmental quality. As we 
will see, the advantage of this model in comparison to the environmental Kuznets curve 
concept is that it is consistent with the empirical evidence contradicting the environmental 
Kuznets curve discussed in Section 1. 
Let the first stage be the pre-industrial revolution phase, where the population engages 
primarily in agriculture (using primitive techniques) and its ecological impact is relatively 
low such that the environmental quality is relatively high (except in the few larger cities, 
where the pollution may be high due to sewage and primitive industry, e.g., tanning). Assume 
that, then, by some endogenous or exogenous impulse, the country starts to develop. In 
general, this development is manifested by industrialization (as was the case in the early 
phases of development of the today’s highly developed countries) or increasing intensity and 
modernization of agriculture (as was/is often the case in the today’s developing countries). 
Both ways of development are accompanied by increasing pollution, i.e., decreasing 
environmental quality. That is, due to the endogenous or exogenous impulse, the country 
enters the pollution phase (cf. Section 3). Note that the standard economic development 
theories discuss different endogenous/exogenous development impulses. For example, Galor 
(2011) discusses endogenous impulses, where the primitive economy starts to grow 
significantly when certain endogenous accumulation processes (e.g., the interaction across 
technology, population growth, and human capital) allow it to escape from the Malthusian 
development trap. An example of the exogenous impulses that may initiate a phase of fast 
economic growth is colonialization as discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
The characteristics of the pollution phase are described in Section 3: depending on 
technology, preferences, and the political system quality/stability, it may be a period of 
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prolonged and strong (but decreasing) economic growth and decreasing environmental 
quality or a relatively short period where the high economic growth rate decreases quickly 
due to the negative effects of strong pollution and increasing social dissatisfaction. Many 
transitional economies seem to display the latter (short) type of the pollution phase. 
Finally, as discussed in Section 3, the country enters the ecological phase due to the negative 
effects of pollution on the economic and socio-cultural systems. In particular, the society 
enforces a switch in the policy regime and establishes a policy that is more environment-
friendly (and, potentially, less supportive of economic growth). The ecological phase is not 
necessarily characterized by an increasing environmental quality; at least, it is characterized 
by a lower rate of environmental quality degradation. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The long-run dynamics of environmental quality are determined by the interactions across the 
political, economic, environmental/natural, and socio-cultural systems and, thus, require an 
interdisciplinary treatment. By using a relatively simple model structure depicting the 
interactions across these systems and a qualitative modeling approach, we have shown that 
the long-run environmental quality dynamics can be understood in terms of a feedback-loop 
system with self-regulation mechanisms (half-cycles). This system can  
(1.) explain the existence of (long) phases of environmental pollution and the switch to a 
more environment-friendly ecological phase, 
(2.) be used to elaborate the determinants of the characteristics of the pollution phase and to 
(theoretically) explain the observable cross-country differences in these characteristics (see 
the end of Section 3 for a summary), and  
(3.) serve as a basis for a three-stage model of environmental development (see Section 4). 
The mere existence of the environmental-pollution-regulatory mechanisms (A)-(C) derived in 
Section 3, does not imply that (a) the society and the environment will not be devastated by 
environmental pollution and ecological changes and (b) intense social/political efforts are 
unnecessary to stop the destruction of the environment and the ecological system. In 
particular, our paper does not imply that the regulatory mechanisms (A)-(C) are efficient or 
socially optimal (social-welfare maximizing).2 Rather, our model describes the whole socio-
economic-technological-natural complex within which the society destructs the environment 
and tries to restrict this destruction. That is, our model covers all the possible outcomes of 
environmental pollution and identifies the aspects of the system that can create outcomes that 
are characterized by a very slow reaction of the system to environmental degradation and, 
thus, high environmental destruction. Moreover, while the environmental Kuznets curve has 
been criticized heavily for its implication that the environmental destruction can be reversed 
(to some extent) our model does neither require nor imply this possibility (but can be 
consistent with it if required). 
While our paper is devoted to the propagation of PENS-system modeling in conjunction with 
the qualitative feedback loop analysis emphasized by Coyle (2000) and, thus, our model is 
relatively simple (yet comprehensive), it can be expanded along different dimensions: 
                                                     
2 For example, the model-endogenous switch to the environment-friendly policy π1 may occur too late such that 
the environmental degradation (and climate change) cannot be stopped or reversed anymore and, thus, the 
society is captured in low levels of satisfaction. 
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1.) The interconnections between the four PENS systems (cf. Figure 1) could be discussed in 
more detail or even complemented by further interconnections (provided that there is 
theoretical and empirical support for these complements). Two examples may clarify this 
aspect. First, we have not discussed the possibility that the policy regime tries to support 
itself (i.e., to prevent a change from policy π2 to policy π1) via marketing, propaganda, or 
even violence/suppression. In this case, there would be an arrow from the political to the 
socio-cultural system in Figure 1, and π2 may then persist even if s < σ (cf. (3)). That is, 
political stability would be ensured via this channel. The decision for the ecological phase is, 
then, not made in the socio-cultural system but in the political system, which may delay the 
ecological phase in some cases. Second, in many democratic regimes, industrial organizations 
have a significant effect on policy and society and may be interested in preventing the 
ecological phase. In this case, we would have to draw arrows from the economic system to 
the political and socio-cultural systems. The impact on the political system is not relevant in 
this context (the policy regime would be replaced when s < σ irrespective of the opinion of 
the economic system) unless the political regime has the already mentioned possibilities to 
enforce its stability via marketing, propaganda, or suppression/violence. However, the 
marketing from the economic to the socio-cultural system can be effective in this context, i.e., 
it may prolong the pollution phase. 
2.) Each of the four PENS systems could be modeled in more detail. In particular, we have 
chosen for each of them only one (real-valued) indicator. In contrast, each of the systems is 
more adequately described by several variables. For example, the economic system could be 
described by a vector of indices covering not only an activity index (e.g., GDP) but also a 
personal-income inequality index. The environmental/natural system could distinguish 
between local and global (i.e., ecological) effects of environmental pollution as well as 
different forms of resource depletion (renewable vs. non-renewable resources). This 
extension would not only specify more exactly the connections between the (different indices 
of the) four PENS systems but also allow for consideration of intra-system interconnections 
and dynamics. 
3.) A more detailed study of the time structure of the model seems interesting as well. The 
model presented in this paper is already characterized by reaction lags. In particular, the 
(discrete) policy change (from π2 to π1) as a reaction to economic and natural system 
dynamics occurs with a lag due to the homeostatic nature of the political system (cf. (3)). A 
further study of the possible lags and velocity of dynamics of different (variables of the) 
systems seems interesting. Such a study requires profound (interdisciplinary) knowledge (of 
theory and empirics) of the different systems and could yield models in which qualitative 
simulation methods (cf. Kuipers, 1986) could be applied more rigorously. 
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